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Introduction
While insurance is traditionally an international business, the degree of internationalisation
is difficult to measure due to a lack of data. By contrast, cross-border banking and capital
markets transactions are well documented, which supports both policymakers and business
leaders in their decision-making. With the advance to Solvency II, the single market in
insurance will be reinforced. The new common capital framework may also lead to market
restructuring.1 Earlier examples of regulatory-driven market structuring are the adoption of
the third life and non-life directives, which introduced the single market with home country
control, and the introduction of the euro, both in the 1990s. The subsequent wave of intra-
European consolidation was stronger in the insurance sector than in other financial
sectors.2
1 Stoyanova and Gründl (2014).
2 Berger et al. (1999).
The new risk-based capital framework leaves room for supervisory interpretation
and discretion (e.g. in the model-approval process or the application of capital add-ons in
Pillar 2). Solvency II may thus give rise to level playing field discussions between the
insurance industry and supervisors.3 A detailed overview of the market aids an informed
debate about the materiality of level playing field issues. It also helps supervisors to assess
the impact of Solvency II across Europe.
The aim of this paper is twofold. The first aim is to provide a comprehensive overview of
cross-border insurance in Europe. The data sources on international insurance provide a
scattered view of the European market. The European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Authority (EIOPA) publishes data on cross-border branches, while OECD
Insurance Statistics provide an aggregate, albeit incomplete, overview of foreign sub-
sidiaries. We complement these public data with supervisory data. The so-called colleges
of supervisors, with representatives from the home country, host countries and EIOPA,
enhance the consistent and effective supervision of European cross-border insurers.4
The Helsinki Protocol describes the required collaboration between European insurance
supervisors in the group supervision of these insurance groups. As part of this group
supervision, EIOPA has collected the “Helsinki list” of European insurance groups, with a
detailed breakdown of branches and subsidiaries by country of the major insurers across
the European Economic Area (EEA). In addition, EIOPA collects the “U.S. list” of
European branches and subsidiaries of major U.S. insurers.5 We develop a methodology to
link the Helsinki and U.S. data to the EIOPA data on foreign branches and OECD data on
foreign subsidiaries. The result is a new and comprehensive data set of cross-border
insurance in Europe.
The second aim is to examine whether cross-border insurance has been increasing
since 2000. An increase of cross-border insurance would pose new coordination
challenges for European supervisors. In the literature, gross written premiums (GWP) is
used as dominant indicator for the geographical segmentation of insurance business.6
Our results show that cross-border insurance, measured by GWP, amounts to 36 per cent
of total GWP in EU countries in 2012, while the comparable number for banking,
measured by assets, stands at 25 per cent of total banking assets in EU countries. Moving
from country to individual firm level, the results indicate that the 25 largest European
insurers are very international, with 32 per cent of a large insurer’s GWP in the rest of
Europe and 27 per cent in the rest of the world. Again the large banks are less
international, with 24 per cent of a large bank’s assets in the rest of Europe and 23 per
cent in the rest of the world. Our results confirm the international orientation of insurance
found in earlier studies.7 Applying Tobit regressions, we find that the increase of cross-
border insurance at the 25 largest European insurers is statistically significant over the
2000–2012 period.
3 Starita and Malafronte (2014).
4 Moshirian (2012).
5 The Helsinki list and U.S. list data are confidential. We use data aggregated at country level, which cannot be
related to individual insurance groups.
6 For example, van der Zwet (2003); Schoenmaker et al. (2008).
7 van der Zwet (2003); Focarelli and Pozzolo (2008).
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Insurance is thus more international than banking. Moreover, the internationalisation is
rising. This raises the question whether there is a case for an Insurance Union following the
Banking Union. Since the crisis, national supervisors, both in Europe and beyond, tend to
require overcapitalisation of local subsidiaries.8 Insurance groups have thus pockets of
capital locked up in the various jurisdictions in which they operate. Consolidated super-
vision, including centralised capital management, would be an argument in favour of
centralised supervision. Another argument is the business practice of integrated asset
management at large insurers. Next, some supervisors are no doubt tougher than other
supervisors, also under the new harmonised Solvency II framework.9 Finally, game theory
indicates that supervisors will not cooperate when interests diverge.10 A centralised super-
visor may be an effective solution to improve supervision and address level playing field
issues.
But on the other side, insurance is less subject to systemic risk and related externalities
than banking.11 Cross-border externalities are the main reason for Banking Union. More-
over, insurance is largely local business, as products are attuned to local tax, social security
and legal rules (e.g. liability law).
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literature on internatio-
nalisation. Next, we develop a systemic approach to link the various data sets and a
methodology to test for an increase in internationalisation. The latter two sections present our
results on the current state of cross-border insurance activities at the country level and at the
firm level. We compare our results for Europe with the internationalisation in North America
and Asia. The penultimate section discusses the supervisory challenges. Finally, the last
section presents the conclusions.
Methodology and data
Methodology
In the literature, a variety of indicators are used to measure internationalisation. Research on
the internationalisation of financial firms is extensive, but most studies focus on banks.12 At
the country level, De Nicoló et al.13 measure internationalisation through foreign bank
ownerships, that is, the amount of total assets in which foreign banks have an equity share of
50 per cent or more. Next, Claessens and van Horen14 define foreign bank presence as the
number of foreign banks as a share of total banks in a country. Finally, Schoenmaker15
measures international banking by the amount of foreign lending as a share of total lending in
a country.
8 Cerutti and Schmieder (2014).
9 Sironi (2002).
10 Claessens et al. (2010); Schoenmaker (2011).
11 Weiss and Mühlnickel (2014).
12 see Moshirian (2006), for an overview.
13 De Nicoló et al. (2004).
14 Claessens and van Horen (2014).
15 Schoenmaker (2013).
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At the firm level, early research focuses on non-financial institutions, but more recent
papers also examine the degree of internationalisation of financial firms. A first line
of research measures internationalisation for non-financial institutions by a single
variable.16 Sullivan17 reviews 17 papers that research the measurement of internationali-
sation based on a single variable and finds that using only one single indicator increases
the possibility of measurement errors. He recommends using a multidimensional
measurement method, called the Trans Nationality Index (TNI), which is calculated as
an unweighted average of (i) foreign assets to total assets, (ii) foreign income to total
income and (iii) foreign employment to total employment. Next, Gulamhussen et al.18
establish a more complete set of measures, examining (i) the number of foreign countries
in which a bank is active divided by the maximum number of foreign countries in which
the most international active bank is active, (ii) the share of foreign assets and (iii) a
transformed Hirsch–Herfindahl index that measures international concentration. How-
ever, Ramaswamy et al.19 find little support for Sullivan’s findings and recommend the
use of the dominant indicator in the respective industry.
As mentioned before, the internationalisation of the insurance industry has not been
covered as extensively as that of the banking sector. Eppink and van Rhijn20 research the
degree of internationalisation of several Dutch insurance companies by examining the
geographic distribution of revenues, profits and employees. In an international study, van der
Zwet21 investigates the internationalisation of the 53 largest financial groups worldwide by
looking at the geographical diversification of total revenues (gross written premiums). She
finds that insurance groups are more internationally oriented than banking groups.
In sum, revenues (income), assets, employees and a count of foreign country activity are
generally used to measure internationalisation for non-financial firms. For banks, the amount
of foreign assets is the dominant indicator.15 For insurance companies, GWP is the dominant
indicator for the measurement for internationalisation.6 Assets have become less meaningful
as an indicator of internationalisation for insurance. Insurers are increasingly adopting a
centralised asset management strategy by which they acquire assets globally, unrelated to the
geographical spread of their insurance underwriting activities. Following Ramaswamy
et al.19 we use the dominant indicator to determine geographical segmentation in the
insurance industry. This variable is the amount of GWP. If data on the geographical split of
GWP is unavailable, we turn to a geographical split of employees and subsequently to the
location of assets.
To analyse the geographic segmentation of European insurers, we denote the home
country by h, all European countries by the set EU, and all countries outside the EU (the rest
of the world) as the set ROW. The relative share of GWP of insurer j in country i is denoted
by αi,j. The GWP of insurer j in the home country, the rest of Europe and the rest of the world
sum up to 1, that is, we have that αh,j+ αEU\{h}, j+αROW,j= 1.
16 For example, Geringer et al. (1989).
17 Sullivan (1994).
18 Gulamhussen et al. (2014).
19 Ramaswamy et al. (1996).
20 Eppink and van Rhijn (1988).
21 van der Zwet (2003).
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At the country level, we can also split the origin of gross written premiums. ICi,j denotes
the dummy for the domicile country of an insurance company (IC). The dummy ICh,j is 1 if
insurer j is domiciled in the home country, and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, ICEU\{h},j is 1 if
insurer j is domiciled in the rest of Europe and ICROW,j is 1 if insurer j is domiciled in the rest
of the world. Formally, we calculate the following indices for the respective shares of
country:
Hi ¼
P
j ai;j  GWPj  ICh;jP
j ai;j  GWPj
; (1)
Ri ¼
P
j ai;j  GWPj  ICEU n hf g;jP
j ai;j  GWPj
; (2)
Wi ¼
P
j ai;j  GWPj  ICROW ;jP
j ai;j  GWPj
: (3)
We denote the domestic share of country i with Hi, the regional share with Ri and the
global share withWi. Again, the domestic, regional and global GWP shares of country i sum
up to 1. The GWP for each segment region is thus divided by the total premiums written by
the insurer to determine the percentage GWP in each geographical segment. In some parts of
the analysis region and world are separated, while in other parts they are added together
under international INT. Throughout the paper, we use weighted averages (weighted by
GWP) to establish the internationalisation of a group of countries (e.g. the EU) or a group of
insurers (e.g. the top 20).
Following the trend of increased globalisation and consolidation in the insurance sector,
we develop the hypothesis that the amount of cross-border GWP written in Europe has
increased between 2000 and 2012. Specifically, we test that both the regional (H1) and the
global (H2) share of GWP have increased during these years. By definition, this means that
also the international GWP share must have increased (H3).
In order to test whether the international share of GWP of the European insurers has
increased, and whether this trend is significant, we apply Tobit regression models. The Tobit
regression model is used because our dependent variable, that is, the regional, global and
international shares of the European insurers (denoted by αEU\{h}, αROW and αINT), is limited
to values between zero and one. This could result in limitations when using an ordinary least
squares regression (OLS) model. To test whether a trend exists we use the following
regression equation:
αi Yearð Þ ¼ β + γ Year - 1999ð Þ + εi with i ϵ EU n fhf g;
for Years ¼ 2000; 2001; ¼ 2012; ð4Þ
where γ indicates the trend coefficient.
Data
At the country level, comprehensive cross-border data is not available. The data sources on
international insurance provide a scattered view of the European market. EIOPA publishes
data on cross-border branches as a statistical annex to its Financial Stability Reports, while
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OECD Insurance Statistics provide an aggregate, albeit incomplete, overview of foreign
subsidiaries. The EIOPA statistical annex contains insurance data, including country data on
total country GWP, foreign branches and premiums of life and non-life insurance. Next, the
OECD Insurance Statistics contain country data on the absolute number of foreign
subsidiaries and GWP written by these subsidiaries and cover the majority of the large
insurance markets in Europe, including Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the U.K.
However, for other larger countries such as France and Ireland, no data from the OECD are
available. A complete picture of the European insurance market and its degree of
internationalisation can therefore not be established from these sources.
This paper has circumvented the partial unavailability of these aggregate data by
combining aggregate data with data from the so-called Helsinki list and the U.S. list. The
Helsinki list is a bottom-up data set on all significant cross-border activities of European
insurance groups that are active across borders in the EEA. EIOPA receives data from each
group supervisor with a summary of cross-border activities such as the number of EU/EEA
branches, EU/EEA subsidiaries, the number of branches/subsidiaries in non-EU/EEA
countries and the GWP written by each insurance entity. All the major European cross-
border insurers are included in this list, which makes the cross-border coverage very
extensive. Nevertheless, the small, often more domestically oriented, insurers are not
included. Finally, EIOPA provides the U.S. list of the subsidiaries and branches of insurers
from the United States (U.S.) in the EEA. This U.S. list allows us to make the non-EU/EEA
branch/subsidiary list as complete as possible. Schoenmaker and Sass22 provide a detailed
description of the data and sources. Data from the Helsinki list and the U.S. list are
confidential and can thus only be provided in aggregated form.
When combining these four sources (EIOPA statistical annex, OECD Insurance Statistics,
Helsinki list and U.S. list), we cover around 90 per cent of all cross-border activities in the
EU (see Table 1). We have thus data with which we can reliably estimate the degree of cross-
border insurance activities in Europe.
At the firm level, we examine the consolidated balance sheets and income statements of
insurers in Europe, North America and Asia. For Europe, we study the largest 25 insurers
between 2000 and 2012. The top 25 insurers are selected on the basis of GWP. To make a
Table 1 Coverage of the available data in the EU (in €m)
2011 2012
Total
Total GWP 1,082,937 1,115,583
Cross-border
Cross-border GWP from sources 346,631 365,411
Total cross-border GWP 387,548 402,020
Coverage (in %) 89 91
Sources: EIOPA statistical annex, OECD Insurance Statistics, Helsinki list, U.S. list.
Note: The percentage number displays the % of total cross-border GWP written in the EU.
22 Schoenmaker and Sass (2014).
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comparison between Europe, North America and Asia, we study the largest 20 insurers
between 2000 and 2012 from those continents. The geographic segmentation of insurers’
GWP is collected from insurers’ annual reports.
Transforming the Helsinki list to country-level cross-border data
In our research of internationalisation at the country level, we examine two aspects: (1) the
number of cross-border subsidiaries and branches and (2) the total amount of premiums
written in Europe by cross-border subsidiaries or branches. This section explains the
methodology to transform the Helsinki list data into cross-border data at the country level.
National enterprises can be split into home enterprises and foreign-controlled enterprises
(also called foreign subsidiaries). As branches are part of a parent company and thus do not
have separate legal entity status, they fall outside this definition of enterprises. The starting
point of our analysis is to use the number of national enterprises and cross-border branches
from the EIOPA statistical annex. Next, to determine how many of the national enterprises
are in foreign control, we combine data from the OECD Insurance Statistics and the Helsinki
and U.S. lists. To resolve how many branches come from EU/EEA countries and how many
from non-EU/EEA countries, we combine data from the EIOPA statistical annex with the
Helsinki and U.S. lists.
To illustrate the above methodology, we take the case of Germany. In 2012, there are 387
national enterprises. The number of foreign-controlled insurance undertakings from the
OECD Insurance Statistics is 50. However, with the detailed information from the Helsinki
list, we obtain 53 foreign-controlled undertakings. This information is assumed to be more
accurate and is thus used instead of the OECD Insurance Statistics. For branches, a similar
methodology is performed. For instance, for Austria, the EIOPA statistical annex reports one
non-EU/EEA branch in 2012, while we obtain one Swiss branch through the Helsinki list
and four U.S. branches from the U.S. list. This adds up to five non-EU/EEA branches in
2012. Through this procedure of combining figures from the EIOPA statistical annex with
figures from the Helsinki and U.S. lists for branches and figures from the OECD Insurance
Statistics with figures from the Helsinki and U.S. lists for subsidiaries, we fill gaps in the data
and thus improve reliability. In this procedure, we assume that data from EIOPA’s statistical
annex and the OECD Insurance Statistics to be correct unless calculations with more detailed
information lead to a higher number of foreign branches or subsidiaries.
Research on the (cross-border) GWP in Europe is more challenging. Figure 1 illustrates
how we determine country GWP per company type (national, home and foreign-controlled
enterprises and foreign branches). For those countries for which OECD Insurance Statistics
are available, we use data on GWP written by foreign-controlled enterprises and combine
these with more detailed information from the Helsinki and U.S. lists. Countries without
OECD data are solely covered by the Helsinki and U.S. lists. From the EIOPA statistical
annex, we take the total amount of GWP written by national enterprises and the
amount written by EU/EEA and non-EU/EEA branches. Finally, to determine the GWP
written by home enterprises, we subtract the GWP written by foreign-controlled
enterprises, including the estimated amounts explained in the next paragraph, from the
GWP written by national enterprises.
Having deduced GWP figures on foreign branches and subsidiaries with available data,
we still need to go from around 90 per cent (see Table 1) to 100 per cent of the cross-border
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market in the EU. In order to do this, we make certain approximations and assumptions to
determine the remaining 10 per cent. For the countries for which subsidiaries are not
covered by OECD Insurance Statistics and/or branches not covered by EIOPA statistical
annex data, we do know the number of subsidiaries and branches for which GWP is
disclosed by the Helsinki and U.S. lists as well as the number of subsidiaries and branches
for which GWP is not disclosed. In order to determine GWP for these still uncovered
entities, we need to make assumptions. Examining the OECD Insurance Statistics more
closely, we find that enterprises that are not on the Helsinki list write about 85 per cent as
much GWP as enterprises on the Helsinki list. For branches, we find that branches not on
the Helsinki list write around 30 per cent as much GWP as branches on the Helsinki list.
Figures below 100 per cent are to be expected, as the Helsinki list covers the material
entities. With these assumptions, we calculate the GWP that is written by the remaining
insurance entities. After adding these figures to the existing cross-border GWP, the
remainder of the GWP must be written by home enterprises, as all foreign subsidiaries and
branches are now covered. This leads to a complete picture of the insurance market in
Europe. It appears that only around 3–4 per cent of total GWP in Europe has to be
estimated (see Schoenmaker and Sass23 for the full details).
To get a full picture of our methodology, Figure 2 illustrates the case for France in 2012.
The EIOPA statistical annex shows that GWP in France written by national enterprises is
€200bn and GWP written by non-EU/EEA branches is €0.1bn. Information on EU/EEA
Total foreign 
subsidiaries (47):
42,152 m
Foreign Helsinki
subsidiaries (35):
32,640 m
Foreign Helsinki
branches (22):
1,218 m
Other foreign
branches (71):
1,180 m
Write 30% compared to
Helsinki branches
Total foreign
branches (93):
2,398 m
Other foreign
subsidiaries (12):
Write 85% compared to
Helsinki subsidiaries
9,512 m
Figure 2. Overview for France.
Note: GWP for “other” foreign subsidiaries or branches is estimated.
Source: EIOPA statistical annex, OECD Insurance Statistics, Helsinki list, U.S. list; authors’ calculations.
Total GWP
EIOPA statistical
annex
GWP home enterprises
Helsinki list
GWP foreign-controlled
enterprises
OECD, Helsinki and U.S. lists 
GWP foreign branches
EIOPA statistical annex
National enterprises
EIOPA statistical
annex   
Figure 1. Transforming insurance statistics into domestic and cross-border data.
Note: The data variables are illustrated in bold and the sources in normal letters.
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branches is not available. By adding up the information from the Helsinki and U.S. lists, we
obtain GWP from 163 domestic insurers of €140bn, GWP from 35 foreign subsidiaries of
€33bn, GWP from 20 EU branches of €0.8bn and GWP from 2 non-EU branches of €0.4bn.
The information so far is already more detailed than the EIOPA statistical annex.
However, comparing these figures to our established total number of branches and
subsidiaries, 47 and 93 respectively, we find that we need to approximate GWP for 12
foreign subsidiaries, 61 EU/EEA branches and 10 non-EU/EEA branches, as these are not in
the Helsinki and U.S. lists. With the assumption that these subsidiaries write 85 per cent as
much as subsidiaries from the Helsinki list and the branches write 30 per cent as much as
branches from the Helsinki list, Figure 2 provides cross-border insurance data for France.
Illustration: Other foreign subsidiaries write 85 per cent of Helsinki list subsidiaries, so not
€32,640m divided by 35 per entity but €32,640m divided by 35 times 85 per cent.
The next step is to split the GWP that is approximated for some foreign subsidiaries and
foreign branches into GWP from EU/EEA and non-EU/EEA. Table 3 shows that, in the
European Economic Area, about 80 per cent of the branches is from the EU/EEA and 20 per
cent from non-EU/EEA countries. We thus assume that about 80 per cent of the GWP that is
approximated is written by EU/EEA enterprises and 20 per cent by non-EU/EEA enterprises.
The overview for France at this stage is presented in Table 2.
Finally, in order to compare the results with the results found for the banking sector, we
need to obtain the amounts written by EU subsidiaries and EU branches. We thus need to
filter GWP from EEA countries that are not in the EU (i.e. Iceland, Liechtenstein and
Norway). We start this filtering with the GWP amounts written by EEA insurers from the
Helsinki list. These are only two insurers: Storebrand and Gjensidige ASA from Norway.
Secondly, we need to adjust our previously calculated ratio of 80:20 that was used to
approximate the GWP of EU/EEA to non-EU/EEA enterprises. Table 3 indicates that
about 2 per cent of the total GWP is written in EEA countries. Therefore, we adjust our ratio
to 78:22 EU to non-EU, as the EEA share is added to the third country share.
Cross-border insurance in Europe
In this section we present the findings on cross-border insurance activity in Europe.
Table 3 first shows the size of the insurance market in every European country in
Table 2 Overview for France
France GWP (€m)
National enterprises 200,337
of which EU/EEA subsidiaries 36,360
of which non-EU/EEA subsidiaries 5,792
EU/EEA branches 1,853
Non-EU/EEA branches 545
Total 202,735
Note: Aggregated non-EU/EEA Helsinki GWP for foreign subsidiaries amounts to €3,698m. For branches it adds up
to €379m.
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absolute terms and in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). The insurance industry
in France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom (U.K.)
are the largest in Europe in absolute terms. Combined they represent 81 per cent of
all the insurance premiums written in the EU. In terms of relative size, countries such as
Ireland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg score extremely high, with written premiums
being 21, 85 and 54 per cent of GDP. Legal and tax benefits, such as a 12.5 per cent
corporate tax rate in Ireland, can encourage insurers to locate insurance entities in
such a country.
Table 3 European insurance market overview (2012)
Euro (€),
millions
% of
GDP (%)
Home
enterprises
Foreign-controlled
enterprises
EU/EEA
branches
Non-EU/EEA
branches
Austria 17,697 6 27 20 28 5
Belgium 32,388 9 53 37 46 5
Bulgaria 901 2 10 24 10 0
Croatia 1,244 3 na na na na
Cyprus 846 5 19 8 5 1
Czech Republic 6,433 4 11 24 18 2
Denmark 25,485 10 119 13 44 8
Estonia 300 2 3 9 5 0
Finland 8,546 4 50 4 20 5
France 202,735 10 287 47 80 13
Germany 192,530 7 334 53 78 15
Greece 4,829 2 35 18 19 3
Hungary 2,824 3 9 26 15 1
Iceland 435 4 11 2 1 0
Ireland 35,174 21 66 179 33 11
Italy 116,933 7 77 58 98 21
Latvia 304 1 4 5 13 0
Liechtenstein 3,620 85 17 23 1 17
Lithuania 518 2 3 8 14 0
Luxembourg 23,285 54 27 285 15 0
Malta 306 4 25 33 7 1
Netherlands 79,009 13 190 22 73 12
Norway 20,805 5 71 3 34 6
Poland 15,615 4 14 45 18 5
Portugal 8,471 5 23 19 36 8
Romania 1,935 1 24 17 10 1
Slovakia 2,283 3 2 16 19 2
Slovenia 2,002 6 14 4 5 0
Spain 62,166 6 211 59 79 19
Sweden 18,651 5 117 55 37 12
United Kingdom 252,173 13 210 156 61 17
EU/EEA 1,140,443 8.6 2,063 1,272 922 190
EU 1,115,583 8.5 1,964 1,244 886 167
Sources: EIOPA statistical annex, OECD Insurance Statistics, Helsinki list, U.S. list, Eurostat; authors’ calculations.
Note: na is not available. Enterprises and Branches are in numbers.
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance—Issues and Practice
10
Starting with subsidiaries, Figure 3 indicates that the number of foreign subsidiaries as
a percentage of national enterprises is slightly increasing. While, in 2007, 33 per cent of
all national enterprises in a country were controlled by foreign parents, this percentage
increased to 37 per cent in 2012. Another option for an insurer is to obtain presence in a
country through branches. The main difference has a legal character, as subsidiaries
are separate entities in the foreign country whereas branches are not. The number of
foreign branches as a percentage of national enterprises and foreign branches also
increased from 17 per cent in 2007 to 21 per cent in 2012 (Figure 4). Finally, Table 3
shows the number of foreign subsidiaries and branches at country level in Europe. It is
remarkable that Ireland and Luxembourg have far more foreign-controlled insurers than
domestic insurers.
In addition to writing insurance premiums in foreign countries through subsidiaries or
branches, international activity under the Freedom to Provide Services (FPS) is a third way to
enter a foreign market. An insurer that uses the Internet or other communication tools to sell
insurance in foreign markets is allowed to do so as part of the European Single Market.
Supervisors and EIOPA have started to capture FPS of national enterprises, but do not
specify the location of these premiums. Schoenmaker and Sass22 show that premiums
through FPS would only add up to about 3 per cent of total GWP in 2012. We thus do not
Figure 3. Number of foreign-controlled subsidiaries as percentage of national enterprises.
Note: National enterprises are split into foreign-controlled subsidiaries and home enterprises.
Source: EIOPA statistical annex, OECD Insurance Statistics, Helsinki list, U.S. list; authors’ calculations.
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Figure 4. Total insurance activity by number of branches in the EU (as a per cent).
Note: Foreign branches as percentage of total number of national enterprises and foreign branches.
Source: EIOPA statistical annex, OECD Insurance Statistics, Helsinki list, U.S. list; authors’ calculations.
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include FPS figures in our research, which implies that we are slightly understating cross-
border insurance.
Table 4 provides the geographic segmentation of GWP at country level. Using Eqs 1–3,
Hi (domestic share), Ri (regional share) and Gi (global share) are reported. The average of Ri
is 29 per cent for the EU, while the average of Gi is 7 per cent (all weighted by GWP).
Table 4 Foreign penetration of the European insurance market (2012)
Countries
Share in GWP
Domestic (%) Regional (%) Global (%) International (%)
Austria 66 29 5 34
Belgium 47 46 7 53
Bulgaria 36 63 0 64
Croatia 56 39 5 44
Cyprus 29 53 18 71
Czech Republic 1 98 1 99
Denmark 69 28 3 31
Estonia 3 96 1 97
Finland 62 37 1 38
France 78 19 3 22
Germany 75 18 7 25
Greece 46 52 2 54
Hungary 6 92 2 94
Iceland 87 13 0 13
Ireland 4 61 35 96
Italy 66 29 5 34
Latvia 23 58 20 77
Liechtenstein 16 47 38 84
Lithuania 23 74 3 77
Luxembourg 16 68 16 84
Malta 38 44 18 62
Netherlands 83 14 2 17
Norway 73 26 0 27
Poland 35 63 2 65
Portugal 39 50 10 61
Romania 24 73 3 76
Slovakia 8 90 3 92
Slovenia 88 12 0 12
Spain 68 26 6 32
Sweden 48 38 13 52
United Kingdom 58 32 10 42
Euro area 68 26 6 32
Non-euro area 55 36 9 45
EU 64 29 7 36
EU/EEA 64 29 7 36
Source: EIOPA statistical annex, OECD Insurance Statistics, Helsinki list, U.S. list; authors’ calculations.
Note: Numbers are a percentage of total country GWP. Regional (Ri) is rest of EU, global (Gi) is non-EU,
international (INTi) is regional and global combined. Owing to rounding, figures do not always exactly add up to
100. Weighted averages (weighted by GWP) are used for euro area/EU aggregates.
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance—Issues and Practice
12
That adds up to a total of 36 per cent cross-border insurance. Some of the new Member
States, such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovakia, have very low Hi and
are thus very internationally oriented with more than 80 per cent of GWP written by foreign
entities. This is also the case for Ireland, Liechtenstein and Luxembourg. These latter
countries (as well as Cyprus and Malta) also have a relatively large Gi, indicating that they
are countries of choice for insurers outside Europe. Figure 5 ranks the EU countries by
degree of foreign penetration. Our findings are in line with research from the European
Commission Expert Group.23
Table 5 presents a further breakdown of the overall result of 36 per cent cross-border
insurance in the EU. First, it appears that around 29 per cent of the GWP is written by
subsidiaries or branches from other EU countries, while 7 per cent is written by foreign
subsidiaries or branches from non-EU countries. Table 5, which summarises the means
through which cross-border premiums are written, illustrates that most of the cross-border
GWP is written through subsidiaries and not through branches. In the EU, around 31 per
cent of the cross-border GWP is written through subsidiaries and only 5 per cent through
branches. See Figure 6 for a graphical representation of results. Branches thus turn out to
be a less attractive way for an insurer to write cross-border premiums. Though in some
countries such as Latvia, Lithuania and Portugal, the GWP amount written through foreign
branches is relatively high.
With respect to the difference between euro area and non-euro area countries, there is
some difference in internationalisation between these countries. Tables 4 and 5 indicate that
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Figure 5. Degree of foreign penetration of European insurance markets (per cent of total GWP).
Note: GWP from foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches is added together and divided by total GWP in order to
arrive at the degree of foreign penetration for each country.
Source: Table 4.
23 European Commission (2014).
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about 45 per cent of GWP in non-euro area countries was written by foreign entities, while
this was only 32 per cent in euro area countries. In order to understand this, we look at the
largest insurance companies from Europe in Table 8. These large insurers are clearly coming
from the larger countries. For the euro area, these countries are Germany, France, Italy, Spain
and the Netherlands and for the non-euro area, the U.K. and Sweden. In Table 8, we find
that insurers from non-euro area countries are very internationally oriented. U.K. insurers, in
particular, are very internationally focused. Prudential obtains 77 per cent of its GWP from
Table 5 Foreign penetration through branches and subsidiaries in Europe (2012)
Countries
Branches from
EU (%)
Subsidiaries from
EU (%)
Branches from
non EU (%)
Subsidiaries from
non EU (%)
Total cross-
border (%)
Austria 1.8 27.3 0.1 4.6 33.8
Belgium 2.9 43.4 0.6 6.0 52.9
Bulgaria 9.3 54.1 0.0 0.4 63.8
Croatia 3.7 35.4 0.0 4.8 43.9
Cyprus 8.2 44.5 4.6 13.3 70.6
Czech Republic 9.6 88.6 0.4 0.8 99.3
Denmark 4.5 23.9 0.3 2.3 31.1
Estonia 17.0 78.7 0.0 1.5 97.2
Finland 8.5 28.8 1.0 0.0 38.3
France 0.8 18.0 0.3 2.9 21.9
Germany 3.1 15.0 2.4 4.4 24.9
Greece 11.1 41.4 0.1 1.5 54.1
Hungary 6.2 86.2 0.8 0.9 94.1
Iceland 4.8 8.6 0.0 0.0 13.4
Ireland 5.2 56.0 1.7 32.9 95.8
Italy 6.0 23.3 3.2 1.6 34.1
Latvia 30.6 27.1 0.0 19.6 77.3
Liechtenstein 5.6 41.2 5.6 32.2 84.5
Lithuania 40.3 33.8 0.0 2.6 76.8
Luxembourg 0.5 67.5 0.0 15.5 83.6
Malta 10.0 33.6 1.5 16.8 61.8
Netherlands 4.2 10.1 0.8 1.6 16.7
Norway 19.2 6.9 0.4 0.0 26.6
Poland 3.6 59.5 0.8 1.1 65.0
Portugal 21.3 28.9 9.9 0.6 60.7
Romania 5.0 68.5 2.6 0.0 76.1
Slovakia 9.9 79.9 0.9 1.7 92.4
Slovenia 4.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 12.3
Spain 4.2 21.9 3.1 2.8 31.9
Sweden 7.9 30.5 2.9 10.6 51.9
United Kingdom 3.0 29.5 1.9 7.9 42.3
Euro area 3.5 22.5 1.7 4.7 32.4
Non-euro area 3.7 32.5 1.7 7.0 45.0
EU 3.5 25.5 1.7 5.4 36.1
EU/EEA 3.8 25.2 1.7 5.4 36.1
Source: Table 4.
Note: Regional and global shares from Table 4 are each split into branches and subsidiaries. The last column adds
columns 2–5. Weighted averages (weighted by GWP) are used for (non)-euro area, EU/EEA.
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance—Issues and Practice
14
abroad and RSA 64 per cent. This could explain the high degree of internationalisation in
non-euro area countries.
Finally, it would be interesting to examine the difference in foreign penetration with the
banking system. As discussed in the previous section, total foreign assets are the dominant
indicator to measure the degree of internationalisation for banks. Applying a comparable
methodology based on TNI (see the section “Methodology”) to collect cross-border data
on banking, Schoenmaker15 reports a figure of 25 per cent for cross-border banking in the
EU. The degree of foreign penetration is lower than in the insurance market, with “only”
about 25 per cent of banking activity coming from foreign players compared with 36 per cent
in the insurance market (Figure 7). This is in line with the findings of van der Zwet21
and Focarelli and Pozzolo,24 which also find that the insurance sector is more internationally
oriented than the banking sector.
Internationalisation of large insurance companies
Having found a high degree of internationalisation from a country perspective, we now turn
to internationalisation of insurance groups from a firm perspective. This section looks at the
largest insurers from Europe and their international activities measured by GWP. This
Figure 6. Insurance: Origin of cross-border activity.
Note: This graph represents the origin of cross-border GWP as a percentage of total GWP and makes a split in EU/
non-EU branches and subsidiaries. The percentage represents the share of GWP that comes from abroad.
Source: Table 5.
24 Focarelli and Pozzolo (2008).
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section also makes a comparison between the largest insurers from Europe, North America
and Asia. Finally, we test whether the international share of GWP of insurers has increased.
Internationalisation of the largest European insurers
We start with constructing an overview of the largest insurers from Europe and their degree
of internationalisation. As the paper aims to identify the scope for supervisory coordination
problems due to internationalisation, the large insurers are grouped according to the degree
of internationalisation in relative terms. Following Schoenmaker et al.,25 we classify insurers
j into “domestic”, “semi-international”, “regional” and “global”. An insurer is “domestic”
if 75 per cent or more of the premiums are written in the home country: αh,j⩾ 0.75. A “semi-
international” insurer writes between 50 and 75 per cent of its premiums in the home
country: 0.5⩽ αh,j< 0.75. A “regional” insurer writes less than 50 per cent of its premiums in
the home country and a majority of the remaining international premiums in the rest of
Europe: αh,j< 0.5 and αEU\{h},j> α ROW,j. Finally, a “global” insurer also writes less than
50 per cent in the home country, but the majority of its international premiums in the rest of
the world: αh,j< 0.5 and αROW,j> αEU\{h},j. Table 6 presents an overview of the largest
25 European insurers and their classification. It appears that 15 out of the 25 of the large
European insurers are very internationally oriented, with nine European insurers classified as
“global” and six as “regional”. Furthermore, insurers from the Netherlands and the U.K. are
more internationally oriented than insurers from France, which has more domestic insurers
such as CNP, Covéa and Groupama. The 25 largest insurers wrote on average 42 per cent
of GWP in the home country (αh=0.42), 32 per cent in the region (αEU\{h}=0.32) and
26 per cent in the rest of the world (αROW= 0.26) in 2012.
Figure 7. Cross-border state of banks and insurers in EU countries.
Note: This graph represents the degree of foreign penetration in countries from the EU for both banking and
insurance. The percentage represents the share of GWP that comes from abroad.
Source: Schoenmaker (2013) for banking and Table 5 for insurance.
25 Schoenmaker et al. (2008).
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To examine the evolution of internationalisation, Schoenmaker and Sass22 provide a
detailed overview of the biggest insurers and their GWP segmentation from 2000 to 2012.
There are entries and exits of insurers in the top 25 due to increases and decreases of GWP of
particular insurers. The largest insurers such as AXA, Allianz, Aviva and Generali obtain
most of their business from abroad throughout the 2000–2012 period. It also appears that
Table 6 Classification of the largest European insurance groups (2012)
Insurance groups Country GWP (€m) Total assets (€m) H (%) R (%) W (%)
Global
Zurich Financial Services CH 38,843 309,980 11 40 49
Prudential U.K. 36,812 380,165 23 0 77
Talanx DE 26,659 130,254 35 32 33
MAPFRE ES 21,579 56,983 37 7 56
ING Group NL 20,277 339,513 36 23 41
AEGON NL 19,526 366,118 19 35 46
ACE CH 21,593 70,094 18 0 82
Royal & Sun Alliance [RSA] U.K. 11,566 28,043 36 30 34
SCOR FR 9,514 32,590 22 20 58
Regional
AXA FR 84,592 761,849 23 50 27
Allianz DE 72,086 694,621 25 44 31
Generali IT 69,613 441,745 29 65 6
BNP Paribas FR 19,813 170,000 32 45 23
Swiss Life CH 9,978 125,787 49 47 4
Vienna Insurance Group AT 9,686 42,336 43 57 0
Semi-international
Aviva U.K. 27,993 388,540 50 34 16
Credit Agricole FR 22,914 291,100 66 30 4
Ageas BE 9,947 97,113 64 33 3
Domestic
Lloyds U.K. 31,385 80,736 82 5 13
CNP FR 26,439 353,216 81 8 11
Achmea NL 20,455 94,817 94 6 0
ERGO DE 17,091 147,208 77 18 5
Covéa FR 14,815 87,334 89 10 1
Groupama FR 10,764 87,946 80 20 0
Unipol Gruppo Finanziario IT 11,925 83,109 100 0 0
Top 25 insurance groups — 26,635 226,448 42 32 26
Source: Authors’ calculations based on annual reports.
Note: GWP and total assets are in €m. This table classifies the largest 25 European insurance groups into global,
regional, semi-international and domestic groups. Purpose of this table is to show insurers’ geographical focus in
relative GWP terms. An insurer is global if it has more than 50 per cent of its premiums from abroad with a majority
of the foreign premiums from the rest of the world (W). If it has more in the rest of the region (R) category it is
classified as regional. If an insurer has 50–75 per cent of its revenue from the home country (H), it is semi-
international. An insurer is domestic if it obtains more than 75 per cent of its GWP from the home market. In the
bottom row the weighted average is presented (internationalisation weighted by GWP).
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they have increased in size much faster than their competitors. In particular, AXA, Allianz
and Generali have grown substantially over the 2000–2012 period, while Aviva has
decreased in size through the divestment of its Dutch subsidiary, Delta Lloyd, in 2009.
Figure 8 shows a graphical representation of GWP from the home country, the region and
the world from 2000 to 2012. The percentage of GWP that is written in the home country has
decreased since 2000, although a slight increase can be identified between 2001 and 2004.
The percentage of GWP that is written at home has reduced from 46 per cent in 2000 to only
42 per cent in 2012. Accordingly, the percentage of international GWP has increased from
54 per cent of GWP in 2000 (30 per cent from region and 24 per cent from world) to 58 per
cent in 2012 (32 per cent from region and 26 per cent from world).
Next, it appears that the geographical share of world is increasing over the last few years
and “catching up” with the premiums share from the region. Figure 8 illustrates that the
share of world has increased from 24 per cent in 2009 to around 26 per cent in 2012.
In contrast, the share of region has decreased from 35 per cent in 2009 to 32 per cent in
2012. Prudential, ACE, Allianz have all seen a decrease in the relative importance of
regional GWP, while these insurers as well as Zurich Financial Services and MAPFRE
have greatly increased their presence in countries outside of Europe.
Comparison between regions
Following the same methodology, we now look at the difference in the degree of
internationalisation between the largest insurers from Europe, Asia and North America.
Schoenmaker and Sass22 report detailed figures for Asia and North America. Insurers from
Asia are generally active in Japan, India, China, South East Asia and Oceania, but very few
Figure 8. Geographical segmentation of top 25 insurers in Europe.
Note: This figure shows the geographical segmentation of the 25 biggest European insurance companies for the
years 2000–2012. The segmentation is established by assigning the GWP per insurer to the classes home
(domestic), region (rest of Europe) and world (non-Europe). Calculations are made on a weighted average basis.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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have income from Europe or America. It appears that the largest insurers from Asia write
almost all of their GWP in the home country. Insurers such as Japan Post, Nippon Life, Ping
An Insurance and Life Insurance Corporation of India write more than 98 per cent of their
premiums at home.
In America, the largest insurers come from the U.S and Canada (both North America).
Results here are more diverse than in Asia, although still a majority of the insurers are very
locally oriented. Insurance groups such as Wellpoint Inc., United Health Group Inc. and
Humana Inc. write more than 95 per cent of their premiums in the home country. More
internationally oriented insurance groups are Prudential of America, MetLife and American
International Group (AIG), which wrote 77, 35 and 30 per cent, respectively, of their
premiums abroad in 2012.
Table 7 provides an overview of the weighted average premiums from the three
continents. In Asia, 96 per cent of the premiums are written at home. This percentage has
remained stable over the years and has even increased slightly from 95 to 96 per cent in
2012. The share of premiums from world and region are both only 2 per cent in Asia. This is
in line with research from EY,26 which finds little internationalisation in the Chinese
Insurance Market. Findings from Asia are in contrast with the current trend in Europe where
an increasing amount of written premiums is coming from abroad. In Northern America the
share of domestic written premiums is 78 per cent in 2012. This is less than in Asia but more
than in Europe.
Next, Figure 9 shows that the International share of GWP is more volatile in North
America than in Asia or Europe (see also Table 8). In North America, two peaks in
internationalisation can be identified namely in 2005–2006 and in 2010–2011. This volatility
cannot be identified in Europe, where the international share has increased from 50 per cent
Table 7 Degree of internationalisation of the largest insurers across continents
Continent Segment 2000 (%) 2004 (%) 2008 (%) 2012 (%)
North America Home 80 76 74 78
Region 5 13 11 3
World 15 11 15 19
Asia Home — 97 95 96
Region — 1 2 2
World — 2 3 2
Europe Home 48 45 40 40
Region 30 34 34 33
World 22 21 27 27
Note: This table states the degree of internationalisation per continent. It is calculated by calculating the top 20
insurance company’s degree of internationalisation (percentage of insurers’ total GWP from home, region or world)
for each continent, weighted by GWP. Values add up to 100 per cent.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on annual reports. See Schoenmaker and Sass (2014) for detailed figures of
individual insurers.
26 EY (2014).
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in 2000 to almost 60 per cent in 2012, nor in Asia, where the share of internationally written
premiums has remained stable at around 5 per cent over the years. Figure 9 indicates with the
straight horizontal lines that the average premiums written abroad during the 2000–2012
period is 4 per cent in Asia, 21 per cent in North America and 57 per cent in Europe. These
findings are in line with Lloyds.27
One could argue that it is inappropriate to compare the regional segment from
Europe with that of North America. As the U.S. is larger than the individual European
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Figure 9. Comparison of internationalisation of top 20 insurers across continents.
Note: This graph shows the difference in the degree of internationalisation between Europe, North America and
Asia. The degree of internationalisation is the percentage of insurers’ GWP earned abroad and is calculated by
taking the values for the top 20 biggest insurers, measured by GWP, and by weighting it with the amount of GWP.
For Asia, data before 2002 are scarce and are thus not included. Straight horizontal lines represent the average of
the available period.
Source: Table 7.
Table 8 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque–Bera Prob.
Europe international 0.562 0.520 0.603 0.029 0.062 1.514 1.205 0.547
Europe region 0.322 0.300 0.360 0.017 0.844 3.344 1.607 0.447
Europe global 0.240 0.200 0.270 0.023 −0.452 1.797 1.226 0.541
N-America international 0.213 0.170 0.260 0.027 0.126 2.070 0.503 0.777
N-America region 0.086 0.030 0.130 0.038 −0.153 1.358 1.511 0.470
N-America global 0.127 0.080 0.190 0.031 0.379 2.337 0.549 0.760
Asia international 0.044 0.030 0.050 0.007 −0.659 2.372 0.886 0.642
Asia region 0.021 0.010 0.030 0.006 0.077 3.302 0.048 0.976
Asia global 0.023 0.020 0.030 0.005 0.873 1.762 1.909 0.385
Note: This table reports the mean, minimum and maximum values for every variable used in regression models. Also
it reports the standard deviation and normality measures such as the skewness, kurtosis and Jarque–Bera statistic.
27 Lloyds (2012).
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countries in terms of geographical size, it may be more appropriate to classify European
countries in the same way as states are classified in the U.S. For instance, if an insurer
from California writes insurance in Nevada, it would count as home GWP, while a
premium that is written by a French insurer in Belgium would be classified as regional. In
both cases the geographical distance is comparable. To correct for this bias, we add home
and regional insurance premiums in Europe to compare these with home premiums
from North America (most insurers are from the U.S.). Table 7 reports that the largest
insurance companies from North America are still more domestically oriented at
78 per cent than the European insurers with combined home and regional premiums at
73 per cent in 2012.
Testing for trends in internationalisation
In order to test whether the international share of GWP of insurers has increased, and
whether this trend is significant, we apply Tobit regression models. Table 8 shows the
descriptive statistics of the (dependent) variables used in our regressions models. As can be
obtained from the Jarque–Bera normality test, all variables are normally distributed.
Table 9 shows the test results of the Tobin regression models for European insurers
(regressions in 1 to 3). Both the regional share and global share show an upward trend,
although, for the global share, only at a 10 per cent significance level. This means that
European insurers have significantly increased their cross-border share of GWP, in particular
at the regional level within Europe, and confirms H1 and H2. The international share, adding
up regional and global share, also experienced a significant upward trend from 2000 until
2012 and thus proves H3. Interpreting the results, it can be concluded that insurers write less
and less domestic premium and thus are getting more internationally oriented.
Next, Table 9 shows the regression results for North America and Asia. In none of the
regressions 4–9 is the trend coefficient statistically significant. We can thus conclude that
with available data, no significant trend of internationalisation can be concluded for the
largest insurers from North America and Asia. Therefore, we reject the hypotheses (H1, H2
and H3) for North American and Asian insurers.
The overall picture is that the largest 20 insurance groups in Europe write relatively more
of their premiums abroad than their North American and Asian counterparts. Europe is thus
the most internationalised region, with a still increasing share of international premium. The
international outlook of European insurers may have been spurred by the creation of the EU
Single Market and the introduction of the euro, as the regional share is higher than the global
share for European insurers. By contrast, the global share is higher than the regional share for
North American and Asian insurers. Our findings are in line with earlier research by van der
Zwet21 and Schoenmaker et al.,25 who find that European insurance groups have a stronger
international presence than their American or Asian peers.
In particular, large insurers in Europe are very internationally oriented with about 58 per
cent of their GWP written abroad in 2012, that is, 32 per cent in the region and 26 per cent
in the rest of the world. Since 2000, these insurers have significantly increased their
international presence from 54 to 58 per cent and the percentage of GWP written both
inside and outside of Europe has increased over the full 2000–2012 period. Maybe
somewhat surprisingly, the 2008–2009 global financial crisis has not lead to a reduction of
internationalisation.
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Table 9 Regression results for trend in cross-border insurance
Variables
Europe North America Asia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Internat. share Regional share Global share Internat. share Regional share Global share Internat. share Regional share Global share
Constant 0.524 0.302 0.222 0.217 0.091 0.126 0.041 0.013 0.028
(0.011)*** (0.007)*** (0.012)*** (0.015)*** (0.022)*** (0.018)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)***
Trend (γ) 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 −0.001
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)* (0.000)
N 13 13 13 13 13 13 10 10 10
Pseudo-R2 0.541 0.445 0.190 0.005 0.004 0.000 0.025 0.235 0.117
Note: The table reports Tobit regression coefficients. * significant at 10 per cent; ** significant at 5 per cent; *** significant at 1 per cent. Standard errors are in brackets.
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Supervisory challenges
The nationally based supervisory system and the high and increasing degree of internationa-
lisation of European insurance groups pose several supervisory challenges. The financial
trilemma states that the three objectives of financial stability, cross-border activity and national
based supervision cannot be obtained at the same time; one objective has to give.28 Given that
we aim for financial stability, there is a choice between cross-border insurance and national
supervision. Our results indicate that cross-border insurance is particularly advanced in Europe
(at 32 per cent of total insurers’GWP) and still rising. There may thus be an increasing need for
international cooperation between national insurance supervisors in Europe.
This section first identifies the challenges in the regulation and supervision of international
insurance groups and then discusses the mechanisms for international cooperation. One
regulatory challenge is related to foreign branches. The section “Cross-border insurance in
Europe” reports that the number of branches is increasing, and certain European insurers
have announced to transform (some) European subsidiaries into branches. The insurance
industry is thus clearly aware of the fact that establishing branches can come with certain
capital efficiencies related to the introduction of Solvency II.29
Cross-border operations through branches also raise supervisory challenges.30 In some
cases, assets from a foreign branch in a host jurisdiction can be transferred without prior
approval from the supervisor. These assets can then be transferred to other parts of the group
with consequences to the foreign branch’s policyholders, who have no access to these assets
in case of insolvency and thus face the risk of not being paid in full if claims arise. From the
perspective of the host supervisor, enough assets need to be present in the host jurisdiction.
Availability and transferability of assets is one of the most significant challenges in branch
supervision,30 as some supervisory tools are not applicable to a branch where they are
applicable to a subsidiary (which is a legal entity with a separate licence and separate
capitalisation in the foreign jurisdiction). Another challenge is information asymmetry. The
host supervisor may request information of the parent company of a branch in the host
jurisdiction when there are doubts about the solvency of the parent. If this information is not
provided on time and accurately, host supervisors cannot act in the interest of the foreign
branch’s policyholders. Claessens et al.31 note that home supervisors have an incentive not
to tell host supervisors about emerging problems to prevent precautionary ring-fencing of
assets in the host jurisdiction.
Moving to subsidiaries, the host country supervisor has control over the assets and
operations of foreign subsidiaries in its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the host country super-
visor may need to rely, at least partly, on the home supervisor. A case in point is the approval
of internal models under Solvency II. The design and rollout of an (international) insurance
group’s internal model are typically done at the head office.
Another challenge in international regulation and supervision is the level playing field.
Even with a harmonised regulatory regime, supervisors may interpret the “common” rules
differently or apply them differently (e.g. the application of capital add-ons in Pillar 2).
28 Schoenmaker (2011).
29 European Commission (2010).
30 IAIS (2013).
31 Claessens et al. (2010).
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Moreover, the use of directives in insurance supervision provides scope for national
discretions, whereby countries can implement alternative versions of certain rules. Finally,
supervisors have become more risk averse in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. They
tend to require some extra capital cushion—above the regulatory minimum—at foreign (as
well as domestic) subsidiaries, which is not freely available within the insurance group.
Insurance groups can thus be confronted with different pockets of ring-fenced excess capital
within the group, which they cannot use for the group as a whole. Cerutti and Schmieder32
provide examples of how ring-fencing can lead to extra capital needs in banking.
During the global financial crisis, the U.S. experienced the limits of state-based insurance
supervision. The Dodd–Frank Reform Act has established the Federal Insurance Office
(FIO). This agency is in charge of monitoring developments in the insurance industry and
their contribution to systemic risk. If the latter is identified, it discusses these findings with
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The FIO conducts its monitoring role
mostly by collecting information and data from state regulators and other bodies. If an
insurer is identified as systematically important, it can face higher capital requirements and
tougher stress tests. Finally, the FIO is also authorised to help the Secretary of the Treasury
in the negotiation of agreements that enhance prudential regulation regarding the insurance
sector.
Moving to Europe, the EIOPA has a coordinating role in the supervision of international
insurance groups. EIOPA takes the lead in setting secondary rules and harmonising supervisory
practices across Europe, in particular with regard to Solvency II. Next, EIOPA participates in
the so-called supervisory colleges of cross-border insurance groups in order to contribute to the
efficient, effective and consistent functioning of these colleges and to foster coherent
application of EU law among colleges. In the case of disagreement on the group internal
model in the supervisory college, for example, EIOPA can give advice (Article 231 of the
Solvency II Directive). Nevertheless, in the EU, final authority rests with national supervisors.
The question arises whether this coordinating role of EIOPA is sufficient for the effective
supervision of large cross-border European insurance groups. In particular, the increasing
share of cross-border insurance within Europe may pose a challenge for the coordination
model. Game theory indicates that supervisors will not cooperate when interests diverge.33
Several examples are discussed above in this section. There are thus limits to the
coordination model for supervision.
Another approach would be giving EIOPA the role as central supervisor—working with
the national supervisors—in a future Insurance Union. There are several arguments in favour
of centralised insurance supervision. First, large insurance groups typically apply an
integrated approach to asset management. Next, Solvency II internal models will be applied
group-wide. Moreover, it may be easier to assess the complexity and opacity of an insurance
group as a whole as central supervisor than through supervisory colleges. Group supervision
may thus be more effective as well as efficient. Finally, centralised supervision may be an
effective answer to level playing field issues. Some supervisors are tougher than others, for
example, on models or capital levels (a case in point is the application of capital add-ons in
Pillar 2). An unlevel playing field is not always visible, as one supervisor may, for example,
32 Cerutti and Schmieder (2014).
33 Claessens et al. (2010).
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apply more conservative rules for valuations or more restrictive assumptions for models than
another supervisor.3
But there are equally strong arguments against centralisation. First, insurance is less
subject to systemic risk and thus less hounded by (cross-border) externalities. Cross-border
externalities in banking have been a major driver of the Banking Union.28 Next, insurance, in
particular for retail clients and SMEs, is local business, as products are attuned to national tax
and social security laws. More broadly, the national legal setting (e.g. liability law) is
important for insurance products.
Conclusions
The use of a new data set allows us to provide a comprehensive overview of cross-border
insurance in Europe. The empirical findings suggest a high degree of cross-border penetration
in European insurance. Moreover, the degree of internationalisation is still on the rise.
At the country level, 36 per cent of GWP comes from abroad in the EU. Of this 36 per
cent, 29 per cent is from other EU countries, while 7 per cent is from third countries (outside
Europe). This strong degree of foreign penetration is higher than in banking, which has only
25 per cent of its business (measured in assets) from abroad. The dominant channel for
cross-border insurance within Europe is the subsidiary form (25.5 per cent) with a minor
role for branches (3.5 per cent). Nevertheless, the relative number of branches in Europe is
increasing.
At the company level, 58 per cent of the GWP of the major insurers (top 25) is written
abroad, both in the rest of Europe and the rest of the world. Interestingly, the world share (26
per cent) is catching up with the European share (32 per cent). Insurance is thus becoming a
truly global business. Again, the large banks are less international, with 47 per cent of their
assets abroad.
This high and increasing degree of internationalisation of European insurance groups pose
a challenge for supervision. EIOPA, the European authority, is working according to the
coordination model. This means that final authority remains with national supervisors in the
EU. Game theory indicates that there are limits to the coordination model. We suggest that
the increasing share of cross-border insurance may tilt the supervisory balance from
coordination towards centralisation in an Insurance Union at some point.
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